The arguments against zoos and circuses

Over the last few years, the arguments for equal consideration of animal rights have supported movements against various forms of animal husbandry. Factory farming, which by definition cannot give equal consideration to animals, has come under attack, and has rightly received the main thrust of the offensive [12; 13; 99; 100] and, consequently, of investigative research [11]. This has culminated in the development of codes of practice for farm animal husbandry. Animal experimentation has also been thought about and in many countries ethical committees have been established to examine the acceptability of individual experimental procedures. In intensive farms and laboratories billions of animals are raised and kept in conditions which prevent them performing much of their behavioural repertoire and where they show obvious signs of distress. With thought and determination, conditions on farms and in laboratories can be improved greatly in these respects for animals, without a lot of extra expense.

Animal welfare movements have been important in motivating public opinion and encouraging legislation and research to make these improvements, but there remains much to be done. Farms can run economically and effectively, and laboratories use some animals for important research where there is no alternative while allowing animals to live in environments where they show little or no signs of distress and which are ecologically, ethologically and ethically acceptable [101]. Old-style zoos, where animals were kept as moving museum specimens, and circuses where animals were kept constantly confined and used as vehicles for derision have rightly come under attack.

However, it is maintained by various groups that both circuses and zoos by their nature are unable to give equal consideration to animals, and the animals will suffer in such husbandry systems, therefore they are wrong and must be stopped [35-37].

We have examined so far whether animals in zoos and circuses show signs of distress, and suffer, and we have compared this to other animal-keeping enterprises, such as racing and teaching stables and kennels. There is evidence of distress in all these animal husbandry systems, but is this not because of their bad design or management, rather than because they are unable by their nature to exist without causing severe and prolonged suffering to animals? Zoos and circuses can and must change in order to reduce or eliminate any evidence of animal distress, and also to fulfil ecological, other ethological and ethical considerations (see Chapter 9), but there is no reasons why they, like all other animal-keeping enterprises, should not be able to achieve these aims.

The consequences of arguing that animals should not be used or associated with humans leads to what can effectively be called an animal apartheid - in the original sense of separate living and development.

There is a widely held belief that we should give wild animals different treatment - from domestic ones. Therefore circuses and zoos are by their nature wrong. That an animal such as a lion that is traditionally wild, even if it has been born and brought up in captivity, must not live in close association with humans or be trained or work for or with people; whereas it is acceptable to catch and train a horse, cat or dog which has been born and brought up in the wild because they are considered domestic animals. In this chapter we examine where there is any behavioural evidence for making this distinction, and try to clarify what the important criteria are for species and individuals.

Equal consideration for animals?

This debate has been around longer than that over original sin, but in semi-modern times it was taken up by Salt [102] and then again by Singer [21]. There are those who argue that all sentient life should have equal consideration, even if not equal treatment [21; 24]. Some consider that although this should be the case, where there is a conflict of interests, a hierarchy of interests can be used [14; 22; 23].

One aspect of this debate, on which there is some recent scientific work which is very relevant, is that concerning the similarity or difference between human beings and other animals.

Physical similarities and differences

Even most empirically trained scientists are prepared to admit physical similarities between humans and non-human animals - after all the backbone of modern biological teaching is evolution which teaches that the phylogenetic development of all living species is governed by the same rules. Indeed they argue strongly for the use of mammals in experimentation for medical research on the grounds of physical similarity [104].

Of course not every vertebrate is the same, each species is different and each individual horse or human is also different. There are general similarities but specific differences. This has not and is not always recognised. Good science does not use rabbits eyes to test for irritants to human eyes unless it is certain that the response to the irritants will be the same. Since rabbits eyes are different from human eyes, this is very unlikely to be the case. However, the rabbit remains more physically similar to a human being than a Honda.

Emotional similarities and differences

Do animals feel emotions, and if so are they like human ones? The ideas of Decartes [89] have had a tremendous influence on this question. He argues that animals, because they have no souls, also have no conscious experience of pain or pleasure: they are only machines. This idea was used almost without question by the behavioural scientists for almost four decades, and is still a major influence in the research and teaching of many behavioural scientists.

When I was a graduate student some 20 years ago, it was heresy to consider that non-human animals might have conscious experiences. One risked expulsion for suggesting it! The change in public opinion, largely as a result of semi-popular books by philosophers questioning such a view, has at last sparked off some self- questioning of this belief by behavioural scientists themselves. Consciousness, cognition and subjective emotional experiences are now exciting growth areas in the research on animal behaviour [90; 91; 106; 108; 109].

In general, few people would deny that animals feel. To my mind a more sensible approach to this issue is to assume that animals do feel emotions similar to yours and mine, rather than to assume that the animal is a tabla rasa (an empty slate) or a machine. The reason for this approach is comrnonsense; we see dogs and cats, mice and monkeys responding similarly to humans when frightened or in pain. What are they doing if they are not feeling similar emotions to those you and I would experience in similar conditions?

To say that animals feel pain, but conceptualise it differently [105] is begging the question, as Sapontzis [25] points out, any way you look at it pain hurts and we are in danger of loosing sight of this!

We dont only see animals suffering and in pain, we also see animals apparently feeling happiness or joy, as you or I might: the dog jumping for joy and covering you in embraces on your return, the horse leaping and cavorting around a spring field.

Evolutionarily speaking, it would seem unlikely that emotionality does not enhance survival and therefore even more unlikely that it would have arisen only once: in human beings. It would seem much more likely that other higher vertebrates at least feel, too. A rational approach to the question of what animals feel, which is the approach I favour, is that until proved otherwise I must assume that they feel similar emotions to me, just like you do. This means that they not only feel pain, but also pleasure, joy, sorrow, shame, embarrassment and so on. If they do not, why not, and what evidence is there to support this case? The evidence for my case is that I too am an animal, and I feel these things.

Similarities and differences in minds

The sceptic will reply that even if we are prepared to concede that a higher vertebrate at least has basic physical and emotional similarities to us humans, nevertheless the area where animals and humans are profoundly different is in their minds.

What evidence have we for that? It is widely believed that the majority of animal actions are instinctive, that they are all prewired before birth.

There are two important objections to this. The first is that as Griffin [106] points out this would require an immense wiring system which it would be difficult, if not impossible, to house in the size of brain that exists. Also, such a system would escalate complexity, something that evolutionary development and biological systems do not usually go in for.

The second objection is that the more we learn about the behaviour of mammals and fish, the more we find how adaptable their behaviour is; in other words, although there are instinctive tendencies to behave in different ways, these can change as a result of lifetime experiences (i.e. learning). Curiously enough, the vast majority of research on learning and how it works has been done, not on humans, but on animals, particularly rats and mice! - a facile recognition of their learning abilities surely!

Even if they learn, the sceptic continues, animals cannot think. True or false? First, what is thinking? If it is putting information together in some sort of pattern and using this knowledge in solving problems or other forms of behaviour, then it becomes difficult to assume that animals dont since they learn and remember. In fact, as Vickie Hearne [107] points out, it is commonsense knowledge that animals think and this is used every day by animal trainers, pet owners and even farmers. If you assume your animal is not thinking, you would not be able to train it... bad trainers and pet owners do, but they soon give up training!

That animals think is now being taken seriously by psychologists. Walker [108], in an extensive review of the subject, concludes that indeed we have to consider that they do. To my mind, however, the interesting question is not if they think, but what they think. This brings one to the field of Cognitive Behaviour. Here the approach is equally two-fold. There are those who put pigeons or rats into boxes and see if they can grasp concepts - such as the concept of a tree, or a hat. Such research has shown that pigeons in particular are able to do this remarkably easily, and they also seem to be able to remember a vast number of individual slides [109].

The other approach is that pioneered by the Gardiners [89] in their exciting research on the chimpanzee Washoe, where the animal became more or less part of the household, and was given a stimulating and complex environment, physically, emotionally and intellectually, and they taught her Amslam - American sign language. Washoe and subsequent young chimps - some raised similarly, some differently - have proved to be able to do relatively complex and original things with language, which was unexpected [50].

All of this adds up to the position that animals are proving to be, even mentally, more similar than different to human beings. If this is the case, then are our current attitudes and legislations for animals adequate, supposing they are a great deal more similar to us than we find convenient to admit? This is a chilling thought because if one continues along this line, it is not just the familiar animal, our pet or that individual or species in whom we are particularly interested whose treatment and use by human beings we must consider, it is all higher animals. This opens the flood gates to doubts about all aspects of our treatment of animals. Should the human bill of rights be applied to animals, and where should it differ?

These doubts have come to me, not as a passing whim but as a serious nightmare. I have to admit that this is not because of my involvement with empirical animal behavioural research for some 20 years, although my interest in this direction prompted this involvement. No, it has come from my involvement in living with animals, in the wild, in captivity and particularly from training or educating animals. To play safe, it would seem ethically obligatory to give equal consideration to the higher vertebrates... birds and mammals at least. But what does this mean, and how can it be managed practically?

There are various positions that have been taken in regard to this:

Animal Apartheid - Animal-human separation

If then we should give equal consideration to other animals - at least other vertebrates - then surely they should all go off and lead their own lives in the wilderness? We humans should have nothing to do with them, use them, or be used by them. This is the position taken by many Animal Rights proponents. Here we consider what the consequences of this would be, who it would benefit, and whether it is necessarily the case that giving equal consideration to animals must result in such Animal Apartheid, used in its original meaning: separate development. First, let us look at the consequences for humans.

Human loss and benefit

We will consider if this approach is likely to benefit humans. This, coupled with no killing of animals, means that there would be no killing of animals for meat and little or no use of animal products. This would indeed be a physical hardship to some humans, and a psychological one to others. It would require a very radical restructuring of how society operates, and is unlikely to be implemented. Nevertheless, it could be argued that pain and distress to humans so caused is essentially trivial when balanced against the animals gains, and therefore in an ideal world this is what we would want to achieve.

I think there are very serious objections to this argument. In the first place, such an approach presents a very anthropocentric world where animals live in Animalistans separated from humans, there is little or no contact between each other, and therefore neither camp has much knowledge concerning the other. This, in fact, is the situation that is gradually being achieved in some urban metropolises, where some individuals and societies are constantly working towards banning animals, including all pets within them. On the occasions that my dog and I have made forays into the cities during this study, we have been made very aware of this. It has indeed resembled the treatment that many coloured human beings encounter in South Africa.

What are the consequences of this? The humans, although they may have access to innumerable beautiful television films, lectures and talks, although they may be taught that animals exist and to respect them and so on, they never experience them, or have relationships with them. As a result, the humans grow up increasingly alienated from the natural biological world, from its joys and its traumas. They may have learnt to respect and admire animals as alien beings, perhaps like some of us might respect and admire the Queen, but the vast majority of us will never get to know her as a person, and have an individual relationship with her. Our love of her is restricted to her as a symbol of the Monarchy, Nationhood, Patriotism, or whatever we make it. So with animals - they become symbols of Nature, The Wild, The Biosphere, The Noble Savage etc.

Only if we are able ourselves to associate closely with animals can we experience individual relationships with them. Our distant respect can become, through familiarity and emotional involvement, knowledge, respect and responsibility for individuals as members of our family.

One of Oxfams slogans has been that we should recognise ourselves as the family of man. Could we not benefit by extending this circle to the family of sentient beings perhaps or the family of mammals, or the family of animals in my immediate surroundings. The closer we live with the animals, if we want to, the more we may find we have in common, but certainly the more chance we have of loving and respecting animals.

The many areas in which companion animals benefit human beings have hit the limelight recently [112; 113]. There has been some euphoria concerning the importance pets have been found to have in helping handicapped or disturbed human beings. One must be careful, however, that the animals interests are not carried away on the self-congratulatory wings of human philanthropy.

Thus it is that one must argue that the human losses if we were to have Animalistans are not trivial.

Animal gains and losses

However, do the animal gains from the proposed Animalistans outweigh the human benefits from having contact with animals?

It is widely assumed, given a chance, that animals (here I am talking predominantly about mammals) would gallop off into the wilderness and live happily ever after, and that animals will always, or almost always if they are normal, prefer to associate and live with members of their own species. From this it follows that associations with humans, or other species, is forced upon them by humans.

This is blatantly not the case; for example, many dogs given the opportunity do not prefer association with dogs all the time, or indeed the majority of the time. Dogs are a social species, and therefore should surely have free social contact with other dogs at least part of each day, but to suppose that they will always choose the company of other dogs in preference to humans is not the case. It may be that dogs are a special case; cats, however, behave in much the same way, as do many other house pets. There has been little serious study of this question in the larger animals, but elephants, rhino, giraffe, eland, civet cats, duikers, horses, cattle and deer to name a few will frequently choose human company, usually an individual human, in preference to other conspecifics. This, of course, is usually the result of past experience during the lifetime of the individual, but it is not necessary for such animals to have been imprinted on human beings during their infancy as a result of being bottle raised and separated from their mothers.

It is assumed that it is genetically programmed for wild animals to avoid human beings. There are several places where wild animals are not afraid of human beings because they have never met them, or been hunted (e.g. the Galapogos islands), at least until recently. In the Pacific there used to be a group of vegetarian islanders called the Taseday. They lived symbiotically with the wild animals which they did not hunt, abuse or interfere with [115] - so it is possible.

Given a chance then, do all animals that are in contact with humans gallop off into the wilderness and live happily ever after? In other words, do they not only prefer their own species but avoid humans? Again this is the result of past experience; however as a general rule mammals at least tend to have their own home or familiar areas which they will only leave if pursued or seriously frightened in some way. Hill sheep will confine themselves to their own hefts or home areas and rarely if ever move out of them although they could travel often for hundreds of miles. If horses are familiar with having freedom of movement and there is no traffic or other spooks to frighten them, they will not dash off willy-nilly into the sunset. However, if they are frightened they will, but they will make their own way back later.

Field studies have shown that all the non-migratory mammals have home areas of some sort, and even migratory ones will stick to known routes [116]. Provided then that animals have not had bad experiences in the presence of humans, why should they not hang around and have a home area - their own stable and the human habitation?

In the circus, animals such as ponies and horses, dogs, occasionally llamas, and even macaws were sometimes let loose to wander around the tents and trailers or fly where they will, and come back. The elephants in several circuses were also let loose to wander round in the company of their trainer or presenter. This requires a remarkable act of faith as either the animals could be damaged by the public or traffic, who are all around, or the animals could injure the public, or the publics property. That the circus people continue to do this is not I would suggest because they are stupid, but because they know their individual animals well enough to know that they will not want to go away from the camp, attack or injure people or property. The camp may move every few days to a new place, but as with the Bedouins and their horses, camels, sheep and goats, the camp remains the centre of the animals home area, wherever it is, in the middle of the Sahara or Tottenham Roundabout.

Other examples of cases in which animals choose human-dominated environments in preference to the wild are when wild animals, such as foxes and badgers, move into the suburbs or cities. These areas can act as resource centres, or places where the animals can avoid persecution.

The individual animals past experience is clearly very important here. What, for example, about the urban dog which has lived in an urban environment all of his life? He may have been for weekends to the country, for bracing country walks, but he is an urban dog. Like his owners, the dog may well be able to get used to the rural environment should he have to, but his familiar life is his flat, the black bitch downstairs, the beastly terriers mark on the lamppost outside the greengrocers, and so on. It is difficult to argue that such a dog would necessarily be better off and happier in the countryside. The crucial factor in assessing this may well be the degree of behavioural restriction, and his relationship with humans. It is not necessarily true that no contact with humans is most important for his happiness.

Even traditionally wild species who have been captive bred and raised often choose to stay around humans. This makes reintroduction programmes difficult [117]. Thus it seems there is no clear evidence that animals that are familiar with humans prefer exclusive association with their own species, or that they will always avoid humans and leave human-infested familiar areas, or that they are necessarily better off, and would have a higher quality of life if they did.

The other argument for Animalistans is that by working for or with humans, entertaining them, or being available to be looked at by them, their personal liberties and dignities are necessarily infringed. In other words, that all animal training by humans is necessarily wrong. This we have examined in the previous chapter. Again, the conclusion is, that provided the animals show no evidence of prolonged distress and are kept in ecologically, ethologically and ethically sound environments (see Chapter 9), there is no reason to assume that this is wrong. In fact, it could benefit the animal and the human and lead to greater inter-species understanding.

Do wild animals have special status?

The behavioural effects of domestication

A distinction is often made between domestic and wild animals in terms of their husbandry and treatment by human beings. Simply put, it is usually considered that a prerequisite for keeping wild animals is that they should be kept in natural conditions, which among other things usually includes having as little contact with human beings as possible. Thus what is appropriate for wild animals is quite different than for domestic animals, and consequently wild animals have special status. For example, camels which have been domestic for some centuries are trained and ridden by human beings, and this is not considered, except by a few, cruel or unethical. However, training and riding a giraffe would more than likely be considered inappropriate and wrong, even though the giraffe may have been born in captivity and been hand-reared whereas the camel may have been born and brought up feral (gone wild). There are usually two reasons that people give for this belief:

It is often assumed that because animals morphology (body shape, size, colours etc.) has changed dramatically as a result of domestication involving artificial selection, that their innately determined behaviour has too. If such is the case, then it would be possible to argue that wild and domestic animals might need to be considered differently. We will examine the notion that animals innate behaviour has changed dramatically during the course of domestication.

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